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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ELECTRONICALLY

FILED

Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco

02/13/2025 Clerk of the Court BY: SAHAR ENAYATI Deputy Clerk

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO-UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

CURTIS ANDERSON; TERRENCE BANKS; IRMA BRADLEYSHAW; AARON BRUNDIGE; **CHRISTINA** CARDOZA: JOHNNY PAMELA DARDEN; TOMI CRAWFORD: DAVIS: TONY DELEMA: DIEGO DURAN; **FAALOGOIFO:** DONA **ELDERS**; **JAIME** STEVEN FERGUSON: SHYLENE FLORES: FREEMAN; FRED ALEGRA GORTON: SELESTINE GRAHAM: BELTRAN GEMORA: JASON GREATHOUSÉ; AMANDA HINKLE ROBERT HURLEY REGINALD HUGHES: SPENCINA JACKSON; SHANTE JOHNSON SEAN KEYOTE; MANUEL METCALF; ERIC MOSS; STEPHEN PERRY; ROBERT PORTER; STANLEY PROCTOR;; JAVIER RAMIREZ YOLANDA REED; TIMÔTHY REILLY; JACKIÉ ROBINSON; AUBIN SCOTLAND; JIM SMITH; MISAMI SMITH; MARK SUTTON; EMORY TAYLOR; TAYLOR; FREDDY NICHOLE THIERRÝ; ANGELA UNDERWÓOD; RUBIN VILLAREAL; BRYAN WHILEY; CASSANDRA WYATT; SHÁWN BUCKMASTER; MATTHEW BYRD; MICHAEL HEALY; ROBIN KIMBALL; ELAINE LUNA; LESLIE MALLO; DAWSON MARCUS McNEALEY: MAYS: **ELAINE** · SIDNEY . NIAMATA: POPE: MARTHA REYES: OUINONES: MANUEL SHANNELL SYLVE: RUBIN: MORRIS STEWART; LARRY THOMAS; SAM WOLF;

Plaintiffs,

MERCY HOUSING MANAGEMENT GROUP; TAHANAN/833 BRYANT, A California Limited Partnership; 833 BRYANT LP; and DOES 2 to 100, Inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO: CGC-24-615447

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

- 1. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
- 2. Habitability Tort
- 3. Nuisance
- 4. Negligence
- 5. Disability Discrimination under FEHA
- 6. Violations of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance section 37.10B
- 7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
- 8. Constructive Eviction
- 9. Request for Punitive Damages
- 10. Request for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees
- 11. Demand for Jury Trial

Plaintiffs allege:

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

- 1. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege that

 MERCY HOUSING MANAGEMENT GROUP, TAHANAN/833 BRYANT, a

 California Limited Partnership, 833 BRYANT LP, and DOES 2 to 100, inclusive, were,

 at all times relevant and material to this Complaint, the managers, owners, master

 leaseholders, and landlords of a residential rental property located at 833 Bryant Street,

 San Francisco, California and hereinafter referred to as "subject property," or "subject

 premises."
- 2. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendant DOES 2-20, inclusive, are individuals, corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, limited liability companies or partnerships, limited partnerships, or other business entities, whose form is presently unknown to Plaintiffs and who are authorized to do business in the State of California.
- 3. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that all Defendants and DOES 21 to 30, inclusive, were at all times relevant and material to this Complaint, leaseholders of the subject premises who operated and managed the premises with full authority and consent from the remaining Defendants, sued herein as Does 1-100, inclusive, at all times relevant hereto.
- 4. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege that at all times relevant and material, all Defendants, and each of them, were acting under the authority and within the scope of their relationship to all of the other Defendants as agent,

employee, servant, or joint venturer of the other and approved, authorized, and ratified one another's conduct with respect to the ownership and operation of the subject premises.

- On information and belief, all decisions concerning the condition of the subject premises were under all Defendants' control and power. Unless otherwise alleged, all illegal and wrongful acts occurred in or around the subject premises. Thus, venue is properly before this Court.
- 6. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES 2 to 100, inclusive, and therefore, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474, Plaintiffs sue these Defendants by such fictitious names.
- 7. As to those allegations alleged in the complaint on information and belief, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the same are true and correct.
- 8. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each of the named and fictitiously named Defendants are responsible in some manner for the occurrences alleged herein and that Plaintiffs' damages were proximately caused by their conduct.
- 9. Plaintiffs will seek leave of Court to amend the operative complaint so as to allege the true names and capacities of each such DOE Defendant when the same has been ascertained.
- 10. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each of the Defendants, including the fictitiously named Defendants, were the agents, servants, employees, master leasor and leasee, and joint venturers of each of the other Defendants; and, in doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of such agency, servitude,

employment, and joint venture.

- Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each and every wrongful and illegal act done by the Defendants complained of was done with the express or implied authorization and approval of all Defendants; and each Defendant has had actual or constructive knowledge of, and has ratified and approved the acts and omissions of the other Defendants, both named and fictitiously named.
- 12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each of the Defendants acted in concert and furtherance of each other's interests; and that each Defendant, both named and fictitiously named, is individually, jointly, and severally liable for the wrongdoing alleged herein.
- 13. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that all Defendants were Plaintiffs' landlords with respect to the subject property and during the times complained of herein.
- 14. Plaintiffs are informed and believe all that of the untenantable conditions complained of herein have existed from the day each Plaintiff moved in to the present.
- 15. All named Plaintiffs resided at subject premises for thirty-two (32) or more consecutive days at the subject premises, and, therefore, all Plaintiffs were tenants of the subject premises by operation of law.
- 16. Plaintiff CURTIS ANDERSON moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 17. Plaintiff TERRENCE BANKS moved into the subject premises, had paid

rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

- 18. Plaintiff IRMA BRADLEYSHAW moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 19. Plaintiff AARON BRUNDIGE moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 20. Plaintiff CHRISTINA CARDOZA moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 21. Plaintiff JOHNNY CRAWFORD moved into the subject premises and had remained a known resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 22. Plaintiff PAMELA DARDEN moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 23. Plaintiff TOMI DAVIS moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 24. Plaintiff TONY DELEMA moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of

said premises.

- 25. Plaintiff DIEGO DURAN moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 26. Plaintiff DONA ELDERS moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 27. Plaintiff JAIME FAALOGOIFO moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 28. Plaintiff STEVEN FERGUSON moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 29. Plaintiff SHYLENE FLORES moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ALEGRA FREEMAN moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 31. Plaintiff FRED GORTON moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

- 32. Plaintiff SELESTINE GRAHAM moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff BELTRAN GEMORA moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 34. Plaintiff JASON GREATHOUSE moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff AMANDA HINKLE moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff REGINALD HUGHES moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ROBERT HURLEY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises:
- 38. Plaintiff SPENCINA JACKSON moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 39. Plaintiff SHANTE JOHNSON moved into the subject premises, had paid

rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

- 40. Plaintiff SEAN KEYOTE moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MANUEL METCALF moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ERIC MOSS moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff STEPHEN PERRY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ROBERT PORTER moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff STANLEY PROCTOR moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 46. Plaintiff JAVIER RAMIREZ moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of

said premises.

- Plaintiff YOLANDA REED moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff TIMOTHY REILLY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff JACKIE ROBINSON moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff AUBIN SCOTLAND moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff JIM SMITH moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MISAMI SMITH moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MARK SUTTON moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

- Plaintiff EMORY TAYLOR moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff FREDDY TAYLOR moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff NICHOLE THIERRY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ANGELA UNDERWOOD moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff RUBIN VILLAREAL moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff BRYAN WHILEY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 60. Plaintiff CASSANDRA WYATT moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 61. Plaintiff SHAWN BUCKMASTER moved into the subject premises, had

paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

- Plaintiff MATTHEW BYRD moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MICHAEL HEALY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ROBIN KIMBALL moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff ELAINE LUNA moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff LESLIE MALLO moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff DAWSON MAYS moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MARCUS McNEALEY moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a

tenant of said premises.

- 69. Plaintiff ELAINE NIAMATA moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 70. Plaintiff SIDNEY POPE moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff JASON QUINONES moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 72. Plaintiff MARTHA REYES moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MANUEL RUBIN moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- Plaintiff MORRIS SYLVE moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 75. Plaintiff SHANNELL STEWART moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

- 76. Plaintiff LARRY THOMAS moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.
- 77. Plaintiff SAM WOLF moved into the subject premises, had paid rent, and had remained a resident for at least thirty-two (32) day and is thus a tenant of said premises.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (All Plaintiffs against all Defendants) (Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability)

- 78. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 77 as though fully set forth herein.
- 79. With respect to the residential rental premises identified in this complaint, there were defective conditions, untenantable conditions and code violations which together and individually violate law, which include, but are not limited to the Uniform Housing Code, the Uniform Building Code, California Civil Code sections 1941.1, 1941.3, 1942 et. seq. 1942.4, and the California Health and Safety Code sections 17920.3, 17920.10 and related sub-sections, and other city and county codes according to proof.
- 80. Plaintiffs have been adversely affected and damaged by one or more of living conditions which include, but are not necessarily limited, to the following:
 - a. Bed bug infestation.
 - b. Cockroach infestation.
 - c. Rodent infestation.

herein have existed in violation of law which requires that a building intended and used for human occupancy be maintained with habitable conditions.

- 82. Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the untenantable conditions in their property but failed or refused to effectively correct them. The defects and conditions were not caused by the wrongful or abnormal use of the premises by Plaintiffs or anyone else acting on Plaintiffs' behalf.
- 83. Because of the conduct of the Defendants sued herein as alleged above, all Defendants breached and violated the implied duty to provide and maintain the subject premises in a habitable condition and violated other provisions of law as alleged herein.
- As a proximate and legal result of the acts and omissions of the

 Defendants sued herein, the subject premises were untenantable, unsafe, and dangerous.
- As a proximate result of the conditions existing in the premises and the conduct of Defendants herein, Plaintiffs have sustained compensatory, economic, non-economic in amounts according to proof.
- As a further result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs in amounts according to proof for the breach of the implied warranty of habitability and for violations of the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance section 37.10B, as alleged herein and all other statutory enhancements in amounts according to proof.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Plaintiffs against all Defendants)
(Habitability Tort)

- 87. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 86 as though fully set forth herein.
- 88. Plaintiffs asserted their rights under law, complained, and Plaintiffs provided actual notice about the untenantable conditions which constitute breaches of the implied warranty of habitability in tort to Defendants, Defendants' agents, and/or government officials. The untenantable conditions were sufficient to provide constructive notice to all Defendants and, on information and belief, have existed from the day each Plaintiff moved into the subject premises to the present. In response, Defendants failed and refused to make timely repairs and correct the untenantable conditions, thus demonstrating a conscious disregard for the health and safety of the Plaintiffs herein.
- 89. Plaintiffs have suffered physical injury, mental distress, annoyance, and/or discomfort as a result of the untenantable conditions listed above. As a proximate and legal result of the tortious conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs have lost full use of the premises and have sustained general damages.
- 90. Defendants' failure and refusal to correct the defects in the subject premises and their conduct in dealing with plaintiffs was tortious, intentional, outrageous, despicable, malicious, or oppressive; or was done in a conscious disregard of the rights, health, and safety of Plaintiffs; and therefore, defendants are liable for punitive and exemplary damages.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Plaintiffs against all Defendants)
(Nuisance)

- 91. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 90 as though fully set forth herein.
- 92. By virtue of Plaintiffs' rental of the subject premises, Plaintiffs have a property interest in the subject premises.
- 93. The untenantable conditions of the subject premises as alleged above including the poorly maintained elevators constituted a nuisance, in various forms, under Civil Code section 3479 et. seq. on the grounds that Plaintiffs were deprived of the full safe and healthy use of the premises which included full and free ingress and egress in and around the subject premises.
- Defendants were required by law to abate the nuisances but failed to do so and thus conditions on the premises constituted ongoing and continuous nuisances which deprived Plaintiffs of the safe and healthy use of the entire subject premises.
- With respect to the non-operating elevators, Defendants were required by law to abate the nuisance by permanently fixing the elevators so that they worked in a good, reliable, and efficient manner, but failed and refused to do so.
- 96. With regard to all Defendants' liability for numerous instances of criminal conduct which occurs in and around the subject premises, and thus constitutes ongoing nuisances, some or all Plaintiffs, as alleged above, have complained to all Defendants that there was and is a lack of security which allows the regular presence of trespassers in and around the subject premises. Some or all of the Plaintiffs have complained to all Defendants that there is a lack of screening and security which has allowed and allows physical assaults on some of the Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to Plaintiff Angela

Underwood by other tenants, visitors, and / or trespassers. Plaintiff Underwood has been the victim of numerous assaults and threats throughout her tenancy despite her complaining and reporting the assaults and threats to all Defendants. Defendants failed and refused to effectively remediate the assaults and threats on Plaintiff Underwood and other Plaintiffs according to proof.

- As a proximate result of the conduct of Defendants, and each of them, some Plaintiffs, including but not limited to Plaintiff Angela Underwood, have sustained economic losses, and have suffered non-economic damages including but not limited to physical injury, discomfort, annoyance, and fear for their own health and safety.
- 98. By their conduct in maintaining the nuisances, Defendants, and each of them, acted with a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiffs including Plaintiff Underwood and, therefore, Defendants are liable for punitive and exemplary damages.

FORTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Plaintiffs against all Defendants) (Negligence)

- Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 98, with the exception of those allegations alleging punitive damages, as though fully set forth herein.
- 100. At all times relevant and material to the complaint, Defendants were under a duty to exercise due care in the operation and management of the subject premises. Defendants breached this duty by failing to disclose and correct the

untenantable and illegal conditions as alleged herein; by failing to comply with all applicable health, safety and disability laws; and in the manner in which Defendants conducted themselves with respect to Plaintiffs.

101. With regard to all Defendants' liability for numerous instances of criminal conduct which occurs in and around the subject premises, some or all Plaintiffs, as alleged above, have complained to all Defendants that there was and is a lack of security which allows the regular presence of trespassers in and around the subject premises. Some or all of the Plaintiffs have complained to all Defendants that there is a lack of screening and security which has allowed and allows physical assaults and threats on some of the Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to Plaintiff Angela Underwood by other tenants, visitors, and / or trespassers. Plaintiff Underwood has been the victim of assaults and threats throughout her tenancy despite her complaining and reporting the assaults and threats to all Defendants. Defendants failed and refused to effectively remediate the assaults and threats on Plaintiff Underwood and other Plaintiffs according to proof.

As a proximate result of the conduct of Defendants, and each of them, some Plaintiffs, including but not limited to Plaintiff Angela Underwood, have sustained economic losses, and have suffered non-economic damages including but not limited to physical injury, discomfort, annoyance, and fear for their own health and safety.

103. As a result thereof, some Plaintiffs, including but not limited to Plaintiff

Angela Underwood, have suffered general damages in an amount according to proof.

104. Plaintiffs, including Plaintiff Michael Healy, alleges that on or before

January 4, 2024, all Defendants, named and unnamed, negligently and carelessly
owned, leased, managed, supervised, and controlled the subject premises, and
negligently and carelessly permitted dogs with known and demonstrated aggressive,
violent, and vicious propensities to occupy and live on the subject premises; and
permitted the owners or caretakers of such dogs to allow the dogs to wander unsecured
in and around the subject property which posed a reasonably foreseeable danger to
persons in the subject property such as Plaintiff Healy and others. Plaintiffs experienced
fear of being bitten by dogs in the subject premises.

In so doing, all Defendants failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to instruct and control the owners or caretakers to restrain, secure, and control dangerous and vicious dogs in the presence of persons, including Plaintiff, who, in all reasonable foreseeability, might be attacked in the subject premises by said dogs. Defendants, and each of them, carelessly and recklessly so conducted themselves despite the fact that Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that such dogs posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury and harm to those persons, including Plaintiff Healy, who might be inside the subject premises, unless said dogs were adequately restrained, secured, and controlled.

106. As a proximate and legal result of the negligence of the Defendants,

Plaintiff Healy was attacked by such dogs in the subject premises and Plaintiff sustained severe physical injuries and mental and emotional distress.

107. As a proximate and legal result of the attack, Plaintiff sustained

healthcare expenses, both past and future. Some or all Plaintiffs sustained general damages due to the failure and refusal of all Defendants to provide effective controls on dogs in the subject premises.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Plaintiffs against all Defendants)

(Disability Discrimination under FEHA--Failure to Accommodate)

- Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 107 as though fully set forth herein.
- 109. Some Plaintiffs have a disability as defined by Government Code sections 12955.3 and 12926, subdivision (m).
- 110. Each Defendant, named and unnamed, is an "owner" as defined in Government Code section 12927. Said Defendants have, and are, doing business in the City and County of San Francisco, California; and are subject to suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, as codified in Government Code section 12900, et. seq. ("FEHA").
- The subject premises located at 833 Bryant Street, San Francisco, California is a "housing accommodation" as defined by Government Code section 12927, subdivision (d).
- 112. Government Code section 12955, subdivision (a) prohibits owners of housing accommodations from discriminating against any person because of his or her disability.
- 113. At all times material and relevant to the Complaint, some Plaintiffs had a disability as described under FEHA. Plaintiffs' ability to walk is impaired. Some

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Plaintiffs use a cane, a walker or a mobile chair for assistance in mobility. Or, Plaintiffs have other disabilities, such as cardio-respiratory condition, which substantially affect a major life activity and impairs each's ability to walk or climb stairs.

- All Defendants knew or should have known about some Plaintiffs' disabilities because all Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, and their agents and employees have seen those Plaintiffs use a cane, a walker, or a wheelchair. All Defendants knew or should have known about those Plaintiffs' disabilities because all Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, and their agents and employees have access to each of those Plaintiff's resident and healthcare file where such information about each of those Plaintiff's physical condition is available. Plaintiffs, either directly or through co-tenants or others have complained to Defendants about discrimination based on disability. Furthermore, on information and belief, Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, and their agents and employees have been the recipients of notifications about the subject property's problematic elevators by other persons, such as fellow tenants and public officials.
- "discrimination" to include "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when these accommodations may be necessary to afford a disabled person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." In addition, discrimination also "include(s)any other denial or withholding of housing accommodations."
- 116. Government Code section 12955.1, subdivision (a) defines

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"discrimination" to include "a failure to design and construct a covered multifamily dwelling in a manner that allows access to, and use by, disabled persons."

- 117. As alleged herein, all Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, have discriminated against some Plaintiffs by failing to maintain the subject property in as manner which allows full access to, and use by some Plaintiffs.
- All Defendants, both named and unnamed, have discriminated against some Plaintiffs by failing to maintain the subject property in a manner which allows access to and use of and by some of the Plaintiffs. Specifically, the two elevators in the building have been in a regular and continuous state of disrepair and non-operation. The elevators have not been working properly for a period of several years up to the present. As a result of Defendants' failure to maintain these elevators, some Plaintiffs have suffered discrimination based on disability.
- 119. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful discrimination of all Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, the disabled Plaintiffs have been harmed in mind and body in that these Plaintiffs have suffered non-economic damages for humiliation, mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and fear in an amount according to proof.
- 120. All Defendants', both named and fictitiously named, failure and refusal to effectively correct the non-functioning elevators in the subject property and their conduct in dealing with the disabled Plaintiffs was done in a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the disabled Plaintiffs, and this is shown more specifically as follows: At times where the elevator in the subject property was out of service, the

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disabled Plaintiffs remained captive in each's apartment. Or, the disabled Plaintiffs had to try to use stairs to go up to and down from each's apartment. Or, the disabled Plaintiffs were adversely affected in other ways according to proof. Although Plaintiffs and others complained to Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, and/or their agents and employees, said Defendants and the agents and employees thereof took little to no effective action to correct the problematic elevator and make it compliant with requirements of law. Furthermore, agents and employees of all Defendants made fraudulent and misleading representations or intentionally conceals material facts to tenants of the subject property, including Plaintiffs about the problematic elevators. Therefore, Defendants have demonstrated a conscious disregard for the rights, health, and safety of the disabled Plaintiffs herein. Accordingly, Defendants are liable for punitive damages.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Plaintiffs against all Defendants)
(Violations of the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance section 37.10B)

Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 120 as though fully set forth herein.

San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance section
37.10B provides: (a) No landlord, and no agent...or employee of the landlord shall do
any of the following in bad faith: (1) Interrupt, terminate or fail to provide housing
services required by contract or by State, County, or local housing health or safety laws;
(2) Fail to perform repairs and maintenance required by contract or by State, County, or
local housing, health or safety laws; (3) Fail to exercise due diligence in completing

repairs and maintenance once undertaken..., (9) Violate any law which prohibits discrimination based on actual or perceived...disability,... (10) Interfere with a tenant's right to quiet use and enjoyment of a rental housing unit as that right is defined by California law;...(15) Other repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of such dwelling unit...or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy.

By their conduct as alleged herein, all Defendants, both named and 123. fictitiously named, engaged in violations of San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance section 37.10B (a) (1) (2) (3) (9) (10) (15). Defendants, both named and unnamed, and each's employees have acted in bad faith in failing and refusing to maintain the subject premises in healthy, safe, and habitable condition and by failing and refusing to maintain the elevators in the subject premises in good working order so that Plaintiffs herein would and could be able to fully access the elevator, and enjoy the full benefit, access, peace, and quiet of each's residential rental housing unit. Although Plaintiffs and others complained to Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, and/or their agents and employees, said Defendants and the agents and employees thereof took little to no effective action to correct the problematic elevators and make the elevators compliant with requirements of law. Defendants made a conscious and knowing decision on a repetitive basis to specifically permit the elevators in the building to exist in a constant state of disrepair or non-operation over a period of years. Defendants' conduct violated the state Fair Employment and the San

Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance.

As a further direct and proximate result of the intentional, and negligent acts, omissions, and unlawful discrimination of all Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, Plaintiffs each have been harmed in mind and body in that Plaintiffs have suffered non-economic damages for humiliation, mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering in an amount according to proof.

125. Under the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance section 37.10B (c) (3) (5) all Defendants, both named and fictitiously named, are liable for each and every offense alleged and proven and for Plaintiffs' actual damages, and not less than three (3) times the actual damages....and should Plaintiffs be the prevailing party in this civil action, Plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Plaintiffs Against All Defendants) (Intention Tort—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 125 as though fully set forth herein.

By intentionally or by reckless and conscious disregard, the conduct of all Defendants, both named and unnamed, in exposing Plaintiffs to the unhealthy, unsafe, and untenantable conditions as alleged herein, the denials of equal access to a public elevator, the exposure of Plaintiffs to aggressive and violent criminal acts and threats by third parties or dangerous tenants, among other things, has caused intentional infliction of emotional distress to some or all of the Plaintiffs.

As a proximate result of all Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered general damages according to proof.

The conditions as alleged herein have been longstanding, pervasive and ineffectively dealt with by all Defendants. Therefore, Defendants have demonstrated a conscious disregard for the rights, health, and safety of the Plaintiffs herein.

Accordingly, Defendants are liable for punitive damages according to proof.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Plaintiff Angela Underwood Against All Defendants) (Constructive Eviction)

- 130. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 129 as though fully set forth herein.
- Plaintiff Angela Underwood was forced to vacate from the subject premises in or around 2024 because the conditions in the premises were unhealthy, unsafe, and deplorable as alleged above.
- The conditions in the subject premises had become uninhabitable and dangerous due to the failure and refusal of all Defendants to maintain the premises in a healthy and safe way.
- 133. Additionally, due to the Defendants' failure and refusal to protect
 Plaintiff from the unhealthy and dangerous conditions and incidents as alleged herein,
 despite her many complaints and reports, Plaintiff vacated the premises when she knew
 that further complaints would be futile.
- As a proximate result of all Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages for physical injury and mental distress according to proof.

135. The conditions as alleged herein have been longstanding, pervasive and ineffectively dealt with by all Defendants. Therefore, Defendants have demonstrated a conscious disregard for the rights, health, and safety of the Plaintiff herein. Accordingly, Defendants are liable for punitive damages according to proof.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, and .! each of them, jointly and severally, as follows:

- 1. Non-economic damages in an amount according to proof;
- 2. Punitive damages in an amount according to proof;
- For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees
 pursuant to Government Code section 12989.2, Francisco Rent
 Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance section 37.10B, by contract, and
 other applicable law;
- 4. For statutory enhancement according to proof;
- 5. Costs of suit; and
- 8. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

Dated: February 13, 2025

Timothy J. Kodani, Attorney for Plaintiffs.